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COMMENTS
INDIRECT LIABILITIES OF CONSTRUCTION LENDERS
IN A DEVELOPMENT SETTING
I. THE GROUNDWORK
Lending institutions often find themselves as players in the
following scenario:
A developer, D, is interested in acquiring and developing a parcel
of unimproved land, 200 acres in size. D has applied to a bank or
savings and loan association for a loan to finance the acquisition
and construction. The lending institution has essentially three re-
sponses.' Perhaps finding the venture too risky from a credit stand-
point, it may decide to reject the loan application. Alternatively,
the lender may offer only a construction loan, forcing D to look
elsewhere, probably to the owner of the parcel,2 for land financing.
Finally, the institution may be sufficiently convinced of the sound-
ness of the venture that it agrees to finance both acquisition and
construction.
This Comment is concerned with the lender's second and third
responses, notably some of the adverse consequences of those financ-
ing decisions. The existence of some potential liability in connec-
tion with construction loans is, of course, of no surprise to lending
institutions. They are familiar with "direct liabilities" imposed
when a developer-borrower alleges an illegality in the loan transac-
tion and brings a claim under the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(Truth-in-Lending Act) 3 or state usury laws.4 This form of liability
' A fourth alternative, to finance only the land acquisition, would be unattractive
both to the institutional lender and to the developer. The developer would have
difficulty finding a separate source of construction financing unless the initial land
acquisition mortgage were subordinated to any such construction loan. Yet, the
institutional lender, in all likelihood, would be unwilling to agree to subordinate its
claim and thereby to decrease substantially its chances of recovery of the loan.
The institutional lender, financing only land acquisition, thus would be cutting off
alternative sources of construction funding in an effort to protect its interest in what
would probably remain unimproved land. See, e.g., Housing Mortgage Co. v.
Allied Construction, Inc., 374 Pa. 312, 97 A.2d 802 (1953).
2 An agreement might be reached with the owner of the parcel for its sale to
the developer in exchange for the latter's execution of a purchase money mortgage.
The owner, unhampered by the institutional lender's credit policies, see note 1 supra,
should thus be more willing to subordinate his claim to the institutional lender's
construction loan, relying on the increased value of the improved land for security.
a 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976).
4 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PNoF. CODE § 10242 (West Supp. 1964-78); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 41, § 502 (Purdon Supp. 1972-77).
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should be contrasted with that which is the subject of this Comment,
a less apparent "indirect" liability sought to be imposed by ultimate
consumers, not parties to the original loan transaction.5 The typical
scenario involves an injured or defrauded home or lot purchaser
who claims that the developer-borrower has been negligent or guilty
of a statutory violation. The purchaser contends also that the con-
struction lender be held liable because of its independent failure
to detect and correct the developer's errors. Such "indirect" li-
ability presumes a duty owed by the lender to the borrower's cus-
tomer and requires that there be negligent breach of that duty by
the lender before recovery is allowed. Indirect liability is thus to
be distinguished from the concept of vicarious liability or strict
liability without fault.
This characterization of indirect liability is sufficient to identify
three potential sources of such liability in current law: one arising
from the common law of torts, the others appearing in statutory
context in the securities laws 6 and in the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act (Land Sales Act).7  Common law liability, the first-
born, can be traced to a 1968 decision by the California Supreme
Court, Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association.s A
case of first impression, Connor considered whether a construction
lender might be liable to home purchasers for defects in the improve-
ments it had financed.9 Finding a potential for such liability, Chief
Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, seemed preoccupied with
and surprised by the extent of the defendant construction lender's in-
volvement in the development project and termed it "an active
participant in a home construction enterprise" whose financing
5 There is sometimes a second loan from the construction lender to the con-
sumer that provides long-term financing for purchase of the home; however, as will
be seen later, this is not a necessary condition for indirect lender liability. See text
accompanying note 36 infra.
6 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1976).
8 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (4-3 decision).
9 The homeowners charged the construction lender with failure to recognize
and correct the developer's negligent construction. An additional claim might be
brought against the developer on a theory of express or implied warranty of habita-
bility. Such a claim, however, is not easily combined with one for lender liability.
In a warranty claim, plaintiffs assert only an unfulfilled promise and present no proof
that the developer could or should have discovered a given defect. A lender liability
claim, on the other hand, is grounded in negligent supervision. Plaintiffs in a con-
struction defects case would thus face the difficult task of proving that the lender
should have discovered a defect although there is in fact no indication that the
developer could have detected the difficulty. It is not surprising that claims of
indirect lender liability have been commonly accompanied by assertions of builder
negligence rather than warranty claims.
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"took on ramifications beyond the domain of the usual money
lender." "o The court's discussion of the lender's participation in
the construction project raises the crucial question: was the lender's
involvement as extraordinary as the court seemed to believe?
If so, then the holding in Connor must be read narrowly, limiting
liability to such instances of "unusual" lender participation. 1 A
plausible argument exists, however, that the lender's participation
in Connor was not so unusual and that construction-lender involve-
ment routinely takes on "'ramifications beyond the domain of
the usual money lender.' "n Under this view, Connor identifies a
duty of care that might be imposed on all construction lenders.
Case-by-case adjudication comparing levels of construction-lender
participation, then, seems irrelevant. Whatever the relative merits
of these arguments, however, the narrow interpretation has pre-
vailed.18 The decision has been interpreted as differentiating, in
terms of potential liability, among varying degrees of construction-
lender involvement. Therefore, wittingly or not, the decision of
the California Supreme Court has transformed the matter of con-
struction-lender participation into the critical element in the lia-
bility controversy.
The decade since the Connor case has seen judicial and legis-
lative responses to the issue of indirect lender liability, with nu-
merous suits by purchasers of defectively constructed homes.14
Paralleling this common law question are recent federal decisions
struggling with essentially the same issues of indirect liability and
requisite level of construction-lender participation in a statutory
framework. To understand the problem in this context, return for
a moment to the loan-transaction scenario outlined at the beginning
10 Id. at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
11For commentary supporting such a narrow reading, see, e.g., Bartlett &
Lapatin, The Status of a Creditor as a "Controlling Person", 28 MERcER L. REv.
639, 647 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bartlett & Lapatin]; Gutierrez, Liability of a
Construction Lender Under Civil Code Section 3434: An Amorphous Epitaph to
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association, 8 PAC. L.J. 1, 5 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Gutierrez]. An earlier and slightly more expansive view is
provided in Comment, New Liability in Construction Lending: Implications of
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1969) [herein-
after cited as S. CAL. Comment].
12 S. CAL. Comment, supra note 11, at 354, quoting Connor v. Great Western
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 864, 447 P.2d 609, 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376
(1968). The author insists, "The significant point is that, while Great Western
participated in the enterprise more than the 'usual money lender,' it probably did
not participate significantly more than the usual construction lender." Id. 354.
13 See text accompanying notes 41-53 infra.
14 See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3434 (West 1970). For examples of cases, see note
53 infra.
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of this discussion. Assume that D has borrowed construction
and perhaps land-acquisition funds as well and is proceeding with
work on the 200-acre parcel. Rather than await completion of the
homes, he simultaneously undertakes a sales campaign, offering ten-
acre unimproved lots to the public.15 Depending upon the nature
of his development and sales effort, D may be subject to the various
registration and disclosure requirements and fraud provisions of
the securities laws and Land Sales Act.16 The sales campaign may
promise amenities, such as golf courses, swimming pools, and club-
houses, that fail in the end to materialize. The defrauded lot pur-
chasers will then seek to recover their lost investment by alleging
misrepresentations or omissions with respect to the nature of the
community or as to the developer's financial position. As in the
cases of construction-defects disputes, the developer's omissions or
misrepresentations may pave the way for indirect lender liability.
Because the chances of recovery of monetary damages from the
builder of an unsuccessful residential development are remote,'7
plaintiffs frequently seek to hold the lending institution jointly
liable. The parallels between common law and statutory litigation
instituted by consumers against construction lenders go further. A
plaintiff relying on the statutes again must prove more than the
mere existence of a construction loan from the lending institution
to the developer. He must allege that the lender is liable for fraud
as an "aider and abettor" under the Land Sales Act 18 or as a
"controlling person" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.19
This, in turn, invites some courts to focus again on evidence of
additional participation by the lender in the development enter-
prise. Although some courts have resisted this temptation and
15 For purposes of common law liability, construction may precede or follow
purchase of the lot. Statutory liability is, however, more likely to arise with the
sale of an unimproved lot in a planned, heavily advertised development. The
developer will often accelerate sales of such lots to provide ready cash. A lot pur-
chaser will transfer to the developer a down payment and an installment contract
or promissory note for the balance. These notes or contracts will in turn be pur-
chased at a discount by a lending institution. The developer thus has his cash and
the lender a long-range profit. See Timmreek v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.
Ill. 1977), discussed at notes 79-85 infra, for such a scenario.
16 See notes 6 & 7 supra; see also text accompanying notes 69-74 & 94-123
infra for discussion of the applicability of the relevant statutes.
17 For a discussion of the typical developer, small and under-capitalized, see
Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271
(1966).
'8 See Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 405-07 (N.D. IlH. 1977) (defend-
ant bank could be held an "aider and abettor" under the Act).
19 See Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983, 989-90 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (defendant lender was not a "controlling person" under the 1934 Act).
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insisted on proof of the lender's "knowing" assistance in the fraud,
at least one court 20 has echoed Connor and suggested that the
criterion for statutory liability may be whether or not the lending
institution "exceeded the normal scope of financing practices" and
"actively participated" in the developer's venture.21
The first portion of this Comment will review decisions ad-
dressing construction-lender liability in both the statutory and
common law contexts in order to delineate the current bounds of
potential liability. After identifying the limits of construction-
lender liability under current law, the Comment will evaluate what
has been reported. The critical question is whether the existing
framework for determining lender liability, with its emphasis on
level of participation and economic benefit, is theoretically or prac-
tically satisfactory. In concluding that it is not, the Comment will
argue that these two factors should be discarded as largely irrelevant
to a sound theory of indirect lender liability. In their place, the
Comment proposes that a lender's capacity for control of the
builder's allegedly culpable conduct must be established before
liability resting on negligent supervision may be imposed.
22
Building an alternative framework around this concept of con-
trol, the Comment explores the circumstances in which a construc-
tion lender can supervise effectively the allegedly culpable conduct
of the developer-borrower. In the course of this examination, it
poses three sets of questions. First, do current practices of the
lender indicate that supervision of a particular aspect of the de-
veloper's conduct is feasible? Second, how heavy a burden of
liability will a lender be compelled to bear? Are there mechanisms
by which the construction lender can insure compliance by the
developer? Can the costs of liability be spread? Finally, what im-
pact will construction-lender liability have on the housing industry?
The final portion of the Comment employs this framework to
reassess the potential for lender liability under the Land Sales Act
and the securities laws, and in the context of common law liability
for construction defects. It concludes that the potential statutory
liability of construction lenders should be quite limited because the
capacity for lender supervision of a developer's selling operations is
insufficient to warrant liability except in a narrow set of circum-
stances. Use of the alternative framework proffered in this Com-
ment identifies those circumstances and avoids the broad, open-ended
2
0 Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
21 Id. 406.
2 2 See note 135 infra & accompanying text.
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implications of Timmreck v. Munn.23 The Comment arrives at a
conclusion less favorable to construction lenders, however, in the
context of common law liability. There, the courts thus far have
been unwilling to hold lenders liable for defective construction.
Despite the broad implications of the Connor decision, subsequent
courts have found liability to be justified only in instances of ex-
traordinary lender involvement in the development project. By
looking instead to the concept of control, this Comment identifies
considerable capacity for lender supervision of the developer's al-
legedly culpable conduct and, therefore, significant potential for
lender liability. Once again, the Comment notes answers to the
series of questions suggested by this alternative framework that are
determinative: first, most construction lenders currently have the
capacity to inspect for structural defects; second, there are mechan-
isms by which construction lenders may secure compliance on the
part of the developer and thereby reduce their own burdens of
liability; third, such safeguards may permit the imposition of lender
liability in this limited context without unduly constricting the
housing industry. Further empirical study of market impact is
recommended.
II. THE CURRENT POTENTIAL FOR INDIRECT LENDER LIABILITY
A. Liability for Construction Defects
1. The Connor Decision-Birth of the Participation Criterion
Although the logical starting point for a consideration of lender
liability for construction defects, Connor v. Great Western Savings
and Loan Association,24 has been reviewed and commented upon
extensively,25 some understanding of its complex factual setting is
essential for a proper examination of the level of participation
requisite for liability.
Two inexperienced developers, desiring to purchase and de-
velop a large tract of land in the Conejo Valley, approached Great
Western Savings and Loan Association for help in financing the
23433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
2469 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
25 See, e.g., Bartlett & Lapatin, supra note 11; Gutierrez, supra note 11; Lender
Liability for Construction Defects, 5 REAL Phop. PROB. Ta. J. 495 (1970); Lubell,
Changes in Construction Lenders Policies-1959-1969, A Lenders Viewpoint [sic],
44 L.A. BAR Bur-L. 348 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lubell]; Comment, The Ex-
panding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 CoLum. L. RFv. 1084, 1090-96 (1969);
S. CAL. Comment, supra note 11; Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for
Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. Cr. L. REv. 739 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as U. Cmr. Comment].
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$840,000 purchase price for the first hundred-acre parcel.26  Under
the resulting arrangement, an early example of "land warehous-
ing," 27 Great Western provided the last $150,000 of the purchase
price and took title to the land, granting the developers a one-year
option to repurchase the land in three parcels for the sum of
$180,000; thus, what was in substance a loan to the developers could
be treated, under this scheme, as a statutorily sanctioned real estate
investment by the savings and loan association. 28 In addition, Great
Western was afforded the opportunity to realize a $30,000 capital
gain on resale of the land to the developers. 29 In return for its
$150,000 "loan," Great Western also secured the right to make
construction loans for the homes on the hundred-acre parcel as well
as the right of first refusal to make long-term "end loans" to
prospective home purchasers.30 Construction financing was in turn
conditioned upon the presale of a specified number of lots. When
this presale requirement was satisfied, $3,000,000 in construction
loans were disbursed according to a predetermined schedule.
31
26 Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 858, 447 P.2d
609, 612, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 (1968).
27"Under such an arrangement, a financial institution holds land for a developer
until he is ready to use it. Unlike a normal bailee of personal property, however,
the institution retains title to the property as well as the right to possession." Id.
at 859, 447 P.2d at 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
28 Id. Great Western was faced with a statutory prohibition against lending
outright more than 33Y3 percent of the appraised value of the improved land. The
"warehousing" scheme was clearly designed to circumvent this statutory obstacle.
This statute has since been amended to permit loans up to 70 percent of the
appraised value of unimproved land. CAL. FiN. CoDE § 7155 (West Supp. 1968-78).
2969 Cal. 2d at 864, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377. Subsequent courts
have relied upon this financing scheme to distinguish Connor from other factual
settings. E.g., Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
The Connor court itself focused on the "warehousing" plan as evidence of Great
Western's substantial economic benefit and its extraordinary level of involvement in
the development project. Great Western obviously benefited from its resale of the
parcel to the developers; it is less clear, however, how the additional involve-
ment or profit actually increased Great Western's capacity for supervision of the
construction. As one considers the other evidence of "unusual" lender involvement
mentioned by the Connor court, one must keep in mind the same crucial question:
Does this additional involvement increase the lender's ability to recognize and
correct defective construction?
30 A one percent fee was charged for loans made on behalf of qualified buyers
and a one-and-a-half percent fee for those purchasers regarded as poor credit risks.
Additionally, Great Western's right of first refusal as to such loans afforded it ten
days to meet any competitors proposed financing terms. If the terms were met and
the buyer still placed the loan elsewhere, the developers were obliged to pay Great
Western the fees and interest obtained by the other lending institution. Great
Western in fact provided end loans to most of the Conejo Valley home buyers.
Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 861, 447 P.2d 609,
614, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 374 (1968).
31 Advances on these construction loans and 'land draws," lump sums calcu-
lated as a percentage of the appraised value of the land, were apparently used by
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The developers were undercapitalized, however, a condition of
which Great Western was aware,32 causing them to cut corners by
purchasing plans and specifications prepared for other projects and
to ignore recommendations made by their own soil engineers.
33
Having thus failed to provide for the peculiar characteristics of the
soil, the developers found, two years later, that heavy rains loosened
the soil, destroying several of the houses.
The principal question for the California Supreme Court was
whether the lending institution might be liable to the home buy-
ers for such defective construction.3 Though summarily rejecting
the buyers' argument that Great Western was vicariously liable as
a participant in a joint venture or joint enterprise along with the
developers,35 the court agreed that Great Western was potentially
liable for breach of an independent duty of care owed to the buyers.
In concluding that such a duty of care existed, the majority relied
on a six-part test:
"The determination whether in a specific case the defend-
ant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a
matter of policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are [1] the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, [2] the
foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the in-
jury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the defend-
the developers to pay the $180,000 due Great Western in their exercise of the option
to repurchase the hundred-acre tract. Id.
32 The Court referred to Great Wester's preliminary investigation of the devel-
opers' financial condition, an inquiry which had uncovered evidence of the latter's
tenuous position. The majority opinion also noted a financial statement filed by the
development company listing capital of $325,000, of which $320,000 was accounted
for as estimated profits from the yet-to-be completed sale of homes. Such an entry
was described as "far outside the bounds of generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples." Id. at 860, 447 P.2d at 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373. But see Lubell, supra
note 25, at 349-50.
33 Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 864 n.7, 447
P.2d 609, 616 n.7, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376 n.7 (1968).
34 The lower court had rendered a judgment of nonsuit in favor of Great
Western, Counor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967).
85 A joint venture exists when there is "an agreement between the parties
under which they have a community of interest, that is, a joint interest, in
a common business undertaking, and understanding as to the sharing of
profits and losses, and a right of joint control...." Although the profits
of [Great Western and the developers] . . . were dependent on the overall
success of the development, neither was to share in the profits or the
losses that the other might realize or suffer. . . . Under these circum-
stances, no joint venture existed.
Counor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 863, 447 P.2d 609,
615, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1968) (citations omitted).
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ant's conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future
harm." 36
Chief Justice Traynor found in the construction-loan agree-
ment an intention that the transaction affect the plaintiff-
purchasers, the first element of the court's test. Great Western
was willing to commit the construction funds only with assur-
ances that residential construction would be undertaken, that a
specified number of homes had been presold, and that home
buyers would be channeled to its door for long-term financing.
Further, the court held that the developers' inexperience and thin
capitalization were reasonably foreseeable to Great Western. The
"onerous" 37 financing arrangements which Great Western placed
on the developers increased the likelihood that the developers
would be compelled to cut corners in construction.
With respect to the proximity of the plaintiffs' injury to Great
Western's conduct, Chief Justice Traynor concluded that the con-
struction lender "not only financed the development of the
[hundred-acre] tract but controlled the course it would take. Had
it exercised reasonable care in the exercise of its control, it would
have discovered that the pre-packaged plans purchased by [the de-
velopers] required correction and would have withheld financing
until the plans were corrected." 88
The court found that substantial moral blame attached to
Great Western's conduct for two reasons: it breached a duty to its
own shareholders when it neglected to protect the value of the se-
curity on which its loans rested, the newly constructed homes, and
it carelessly administered the loan transactions despite knowledge
"that the usual buyer of a home is ill-equipped with experience or
financial means to discern such structural defects." 39 Finally, the
court found that any rules which tended to discourage misconduct
would be particularly appropriate when applied to such an estab-
lished industry.40
The response to Connor has been to construe the holding quite
narrowly, although Chief Justice Traynor's balancing test would
of itself seem to offer a significant potential for liability on the
36Biakania v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958) (products
liability decision), quoted in Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d
850, 865, 447 P.2d 609, 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (1968).
37 Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 866, 447 P.2d
609, 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (1968).
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part of construction lenders. The California legislature sought to
limit construction-lender liability to instances in which "loss or
damage is a result of an act of the lender outside the scope of the
activities of a lender of money or unless the lender has been a
party to misrepresentations with respect to such real or personal
property."41 As might be expected, however, a formula limiting
liability to acts "outside the scope of the activities of a lender
of money" has done little to clarify the common law standard of
Connor. Thus, courts in California, as elsewhere, have continued
to use Great Western's involvement as the threshold for identify-
ing impermissible lender activity.42
2. Imposition of a Duty to Inspect Because of Substantial
Levels of Participation
One of the principal questions before subsequent courts has
been whether lenders have a duty to inspect. In Connor, Great
Western's failures to require soil tests, to examine the developers'
prepackaged plans, and to inspect for gross structural defects 43 were
held to be actionable. Later courts, however, have been unwill-
ing to identify a similar duty of inspection. In Callaizakis v. Astor
Development Co.,44 condominium purchasers and owners sought
to hold several defendants, including the construction lender,
liable for structural defects. The plaintiffs asserted that the defend-
ant savings and loan association had employed its own architects
and engineers to inspect the construction and, as a result, had
"assumed a duty to the plaintiffs to inspect the premises in a care-
ful manner so as to detect defective workmanship and materials
and to so inform plaintiffs prior to their payment and taking of
possession." 45  The court rejected the argument that inspection
activities conducted by a lending institution are necessarily under-
taken for the benefit of third parties rather than for its own pro-
tection; it thus established a rebuttable presumption that a con-
41 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3434 (West 1970).
42 E.g., Fox v. Carskadon Financial Corp. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 52 Cal. App. 3d 484, 125 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1975). See Gutierrez, supra note
11, at 9-12, for an informative discussion of the legislative history of section 3434
of the CAiioRN-A Crvm CODE. The author is highly critical of reverting to the
Connor standard since he views the statute as completely superseding Connor. Id.
11-12.
43 Great Western had relied upon government building inspectors to discover
any structural defects. Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d
850, 865, 447 P.2d 609, 616-17, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376-77 (1968).
444 M1l. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972) (complaint dismissed).
45 Id. at 165, 280 N.E.2d at 514.
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struction lender conducts periodic inspections solely for its own
protection. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, inspection
activities would not give rise to a duty to safeguard the interests
of home buyers.
46
The court in Callaizakis drew support for its conclusion from
Bradler v. Craig,47 California's second skirmish with indirect lender
liability. Reading the decision in Connor as imposing liability only
when a construction lender becomes "an active participant" 48 in a
development project, the court of appeals struggled to identify the
requisite level of involvement. In Bradler, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Santa Barbara Savings and Loan Association (1) had ap-
proved construction plans, specifications, and methods; (2) had in-
spected and approved the completed homes; and (3) had failed to
make adequate repairs though aware of the expansive character of
the soil.49 The court concluded that no cause of action existed
against the lender because "Santa Barbara's alleged participation was
that of the usual and ordinary construction and purchase money
lender, content to lend money at interest on the security of real
property. Approval of plans and specifications, and periodic in-
spection of houses during the construction is normal procedure for
any construction money lender." 50 Thus, absent the type of in-
tricate participation and sheer economic power demonstrated by
Great Western in Connorr1 or any specific evidence that inspection
activities were undertaken for the benefit of a third party,52 con-
46 This Comment, focusing on potential lender liability to home and lot pur-
chasers, does not address whether a lending institution might be liable to its own
shareholders for failure to inspect adequately a construction project. Chief Justice
Traynor strongly implied in Connor that such a liability would exist Connor v.
Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 864-65, 447 P.2d 609, 616-17,
73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376-77 (1968).
47 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
48 Id. at 474, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
49 Id. at 474-75, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
5o Id. at 475, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
51 The court in Bradler found absence of involvement of the following sort
decisive:
Unlike Connor, it [the lender] was not financing the development of
a large tract wherein it sought to receive substantial fees for making con-
struction loans. Unlike Connor, it did not receive a fee for "warehousing"
the land. Unlike Connor, it received no guarantee from loss of profits in
the event a home buyer sought permanent financing elsewhere. Unlike
Connor, it was not "pre-occupied with selling prices and sales."
Id. (citations omitted).
52 Cf. Sunrise Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Golding, No. 78-4832 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct, Suffolk Cty., Aug. 11, 1978) (court implied that duty of care owed by lender
to purchaser would be created where original loan agreement between lender and
builder contained explicit warranties, guarantees, or even promises to inspect and
purchaser then assumed construction mortgage by extension agreement).
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struction lenders will apparently not be held liable to home pur-
chasers for negligent inspection.53
In fact, research has uncovered no cases in which the degree or
character of lender participation and benefit can actually be said
to approximate that present in Connor, with the result that sub-
sequent plaintiffs have been uniformly unsuccessful. Notably lack-
ing has been evidence of lenders' "warehousing" of land or agree-
ments conditioning construction loans on profits from purchase
money mortgages. In Callaizakis, for example, the Illinois court
refused to infer the existence of a loan fee or right of first refusal
on mortgage loans to condominium purchasers.5" In Christiansen v.
Philcent Corporation,55 plaintiff home buyers alleged that the con-
struction lender had provided final mortgages to many of the pur-
chasers and, moreover, had been aware of the thin capitalization of
the developers. 56 The Pennsylvania court found that the complaint
53 See, e.g., Meyers v. Guarantee Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 79 Cal. App. 3d 307, 144
Cal. Rptr. 616 (1978); Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1969); Callaizalds v. Astor Dev. Co., 4 Il App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972);
Sunrise Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Golding, No. 78-4832 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk
Cty., Aug. 11, 1978); Schenectady Say. Bank v. Bartosik, 77 Misc. 2d 837, 353
N.Y.S.2d 706 (1974). Cf. Perez v. United States, No. 78-1107 (1st Cir. Mar. 15,
1979) (summary judgment for defendant government proper in personal injury
action where HUD found to have owed no duty of care to plaintiffs; HUD's right
to inspect site did not give rise to such a duty); Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty
Investors, 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (provisions in mortgage for
inspection by financer of condominium project do not create duty of care on part
of lender to others); Rice v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n of Lake County, 207
So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (no implied contractual duty to inspect for
benefit of purchasers even though lender deducted from loan proceeds a fee for
"inspection and supervision"); Snyder v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 N.W.2d
725 (S.D. 1976) (no duty to inspect mobile home for defects in workmanship where
lender's level of participation did not reach that in Connor).
Even though courts have been reluctant to infer a duty of care from the right
to inspect construction sites, institutions should be cautioned against neglecting
inspection efforts altogether. Of the above cases, only in Snyder did the construc-
tion lender entirely refrain from any inspection. In all other instances, the lender
undertook at least a cursory investigation to protect its security interest. One may
only speculate whether a court might give home buyers a cause of action against a
construction lender who entirely omitted to inspect the ongoing construction.
544 IM. App. 3d 163, 169 n.1, 280 N.E.2d 512, 516 n.1 (1972). Plaintiffs in
these recent cases appear at a disadvantage when compared to the home buyers in
Connor. Many of the cases after Connor have been appeals from dismissals of com-
plaints; thus, there has been no opportunity for discovery. In contrast, the California
Supreme Court in Connor had access to a lower court trial transcript as well as to
discovery testimony when it offered its detailed description of Great Western's
involvement in the development project. Yet, despite the apparent inequity, the
court in Callaizakis rejected the plaintiffs' offer to provide additional evidence of the
lender's involvement after an opportunity to conduct discovery. Id.
55 226 Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973).
56 The plaintiffs also alleged that the lender's participation in the project was
made known to them by posters and pamphlets displayed in the sales office pro-
claiming the lender's involvement in other successful housing projects in the area.
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fell "far short of alleging an arrangement as interrelated as the one
in Connor." 11 Christiansen's significance is clouded, however, be-
cause plaintiffs were suing on a contract; the court refused to
speculate whether its decision would have been the same had the
buyers proceeded on a tort theory.58
A few courts, however, have chosen to extract a second, sub-
sidiary motif from Connor-foreseeability of the harm-and have
used that as an alternate basis for their decisions in favor of con-
struction lenders. In Callaizakis, for instance, the court supple-
mented its earlier discussion of the defendant lender's participation
by recalling the inexperience and undercapitalization of the de-
velopers in Connor and noting that Great Western's awareness of
those facts had created a foreseeable risk of shoddy construction.5
Absent similar evidence that defective construction should have
been foreseen, the lender in Callaizakis would not, the court de-
termined, be liable to the condominium purchasers. 60
An analogous argument was offered by a California court in
Fox & Carskadon Financial Corp. v. San Francisco Federal Savings
& Loan Association,61 where construction of an apartment complex
was not completed and foreclosure by a construction lender had
terminated a syndicate's equity interest in the project. The syndi-
cate claimed that the lender knew of their interest and yet negli-
gently made a loan for construction despite a likelihood of bank-
ruptcy on the part of the borrower. Finding the lender's activity
too restricted to satisfy the Connor standard, the court also found no
foreseeable risk of failure since the lender had made the loan rely-
ing on its past successful dealings with the builder. Moreover,
unlike the low-income purchasers in Connor, the plaintiff syndicate
was viewed as capable of undertaking its own investigation of the
builder's financial stability.62
The Fox and Callaizakis courts' digressions on foreseeability
reinforce the notion that Connor's applicability generally has been
limited to its own factual setting. The single exception to this
pattern is the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kornitz
The argument that they had thus relied on the "reputation and expertise" of the
lender was rejected, however. No participation had been specified in the posters
and pamphlets beyond that of construction financing. Id. at 164, 313 A.2d at 252.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 161 n.3, 313 A.2d at 250 n.3.
59 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
60 4 Ill. App. 3d at 168, 280 N.E.2d at 515-16.
6152 Cal. App. 3d 484, 125 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1975).
62 Id. at 487, 125 Cal. Bptr. at 551.
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v. Earling & Hiller, Inc.6 3 Kornitz, like Fox, involved a situation
in which the proposed construction was never completed. The
plaintiff, the purchaser of two apartment house projects, contended
that an interim mortgage lender was negligent in disbursing con-
struction funds to general contractors without first assuring itself
that the labor and materials had, in fact, been applied to or set
aside for the projects.64 Aware of Connor and the trend towards
relaxing privity requirements in tort law, the Wisconsin court found
the complaint sufficient to state a cause of action. It agreed with
the plaintiff's contention that "'whether [the lender] will be held
liable to a third person is determined on a case to case basis, with
policy considerations the decisive factor.' "15 Because of the inade-
quate record, the judges remanded the case for a "fair and com-
plete evaluation of the policy considerations involved." 66 The
trial court on remand would quite possibly have focused on the
level of lender involvement as determinative of liability, but, by
ordering a trial and use of a balancing test, the Kornitz court at
least departed from other post-Connor cases in which the presence
of extraordinary lender participation was an essential allegation of
the complaint. Kornitz suggests at least the possibility that a suit
brought by a disappointed purchaser alleging negligent disbursement
of construction funds might be litigated without regard to the
extent of lender involvement in the project.
With Kornitz recognized as the exception, then, the majority
of cases subsequent to Connor have discounted any general applica-
tion that decision might have had. Although some decisions, no-
tably Fox and Callaizakas, have looked to matters of feasibility and
plaintiff's diligence,6 7 the threshold question in each of these cases
has been the extent of lender participation and economic benefit,
a standard which this Comment in part III proposes to replace.
B. Statutory Liabilities
The common law of liability for construction defects has had
ten years to develop and to consider the ramifications of the Connor
63 49 Wis. 2d 97, 181 N.W.2d 403 (1970).
6 4 Kornitz should be distinguished from the numerous mechanics' lien disputes.
See, e.g., Comment, Mechanics Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68
YALE L.J. 138 (1958). There, the issue is normally one of competing claims for
priority between subcontractors and construction lenders. Here, the issue involves
potential liability of a lender for damages arising from the purchase of unsatisfac-
torily completed or incomplete construction projects.
65 Kornitz v. Earling & Hiller, Inc., 49 Wis. 2d 97, 102, 181 N.W.2d 403, 406
(1970), citing appellants' reply brief.
66 Id. at 103, 181 N.W.2d at 406.
67 See text accompanying notes 61 & 62 supra.
1979] INDIRECT LIABILITIES OF CONSTRUCTION LENDERS
decision. Nevertheless, the path of statutory liability of construc-
tion lenders, arising within the context of sales of unimproved
lots, 68 is not so dear: there are comparatively few cases addressing
the issue. Yet, a review of the potential for liability of construction
lenders under the various statutes is useful both to note the current
uncertainty within the circuits and to complete the groundwork
for an evaluation of the participation criterion.
1. Land Sales Act
The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Land Sales
Act) 69 represents the congressional response to the problems of in-
complete and inaccurate disclosure in real estate transactions. The
target of the statute is fraudulent offering of unimproved land
rather than negligent construction or defective improvements of the
sort which generated Connor and its progeny.70 The question
68 See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
69 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1976).
70 Case & Jester, Securities Regulation of Interstate Land Sales and Real Estate
Development-A Blue Sky Administrator's Viewpoint: Part II, 7 Unn. LAw. 385,
400-08 (1975); Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Home Associations: A New Perspec-
tive, 123 U. PA. L. IEV. 701, 706 (1975). The Act aims at protecting purchasers
of properties which are advertised and/or sold through interstate commerce. See
15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1976). Because of the frequent interstate aspects of their
promotion, the Act has special relevance to large-scale resort and recreational prop-
erties. However, because of certain exemptions codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1702 (1976),
the statute is not applicable to all real estate developments. For example, it covers
only projects of fifty or more unimproved lots. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (1976).
More ambiguous has been the statutory exemption for sales of land under a contract
obligating the seller to erect a building there within two years. 15 U.S.C. § 1702
(a) (3) (1976). Although this so-called "homebuilder's exemption" initially might
seem to exclude most residential construction and thereby sharply limit the scope
of the Land Sales Act, actually the section has not operated to keep many cases out
of court. The exemption clearly does not reach instances where land is purchased
as an investment, not with any intention of building, but merely with the expectation
of rapid appreciation in value. See, e.g., McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211
(10th Cir. 1975); Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal.
1978). Also subject to the Act are those contracts which do not set a completion
date notwithstanding that the building might have been completed within two years.
See Nargiz v. Henlopen Developers, 380 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1977). Most importantly,
it has been pointed out that the homebuilder's exemption may not even exempt the
standard contract for the sale of a home in a new subdivision, which does mention
construction of a home by a certain date. See Krasnowiecki, supra at 746. Accord-
ing to Krasnowiecki, such contracts rarely, if ever, afrmatively obligate the builder
to build and complete a home within a period of time. They do say "that the
builder will sell and the buyer will buy a home if it is completed on a certain date,
and if it is not completed the contract is at an end and the buyer's deposit will be
returned to him." Id. This "age-old practice," Krasnowiecki concludes, does not
fall within the terms of the exemption provided by section. 1702(a) (3); indeed,
such conditional sales were never intended to come within the scope of the Act.
The effect of the language of the exemption is to "open Pandora's box" and make
"practically every homebuilder in the country [subject to] the Act if he is building
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posed in this context is whether lenders owe to ultimate consumers
a duty to try to arrest a developer's fraud. Specifically, the Land
Sales Act requires that a statement of record, disclosing certain
information about the property to be sold, must be filed by the
developer with the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (H.U.D.). The same information is provided to potential
buyers in property reports. 71 Section 1709 of the Act subjects
developers and their agents to private actions by lot purchasers for
any false statements or omissions of material facts in either of the
reports, or for violation of the Act's general antifraud provision.72
The Act is by its terms directed to developers and their agents. 73
It specifically protects lenders from direct liability in section
1702(a) (5) by exempting from coverage "the sale of evidences of
indebtedness secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real es-
tate," unless "adopted for the purpose of evasion of this chap-
ter." 74 The question remains whether the Act may ever be applied
to impose indirect liability upon financial institutions when their
developer-borrowers defraud customers.
Early attempts to bring lending institutions under the Act
were uniformly unsuccessful. One court refused to permit an ac-
tion against a banking corporation which had purchased install-
ment notes secured by deeds of trust on the property absent evi-
dence that the purchase was undertaken for the purpose of evading
the Act or that the defendant had participated in any sales opera-
fifty homes or more and using the mails or other instrumentalities of commerce to
advertise." Id.
A new homebuilder's exemption may have appeared recently in another guise
in section 1702(b) added by the Housing and Community Development Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, § 907, 92 Stat. 2127 (1978). This provision
provides an exemption for the sale of real estate located within a municipality or
county whose governing body already specifies minimum standards for the develop-
ment of subdivision lots taling place within its boundaries. In order for a developer
to qualify for this exemption, he must also deliver a warranty deed to the purchaser
within 180 days after the signing of the sales contract and either have extended
water, sewage, and electricity lines to the lot by the time of closing or arranged for
the local government to install such facilities within 180 days.
73 15 U.S.C. §§ 1704, 1707 (1976).
72 Id. §§ 1703 & 1709.
78 Id. The Act defines these terms:
(4) "developer" means any person who, directly or indirectly, sells or
leases, or offers to sell or lease, or advertises for sale or lease any lots in a
subdivision.
(5) "agent" means any person who represents, or acts for or on behalf of,
a developer in selling or leasing, or offering to sell or lease any lot or lots
in a subdivision ....
Id. § 1701(4) & (5).
74Id. § 1702(a)(5). See Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 406 (N.D.
Ill. 1977), and cases cited therein.
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tions. 75 In two actions growing out of another development
scheme, plaintiff lot purchasers sought to hold Westinghouse Credit
Corporation (WCC) liable as a developer or joint venturer. Again,
liability as a developer was rejected without evidence of sales
activity on the part of WCC.76 An agreement with the developers
that WCC accept an existing portfolio of land sales contracts for
previously sold lots and make direct loans to subsequent lot pur-
chasers created, in the court's view, "only the relationship of lender
and borrower." 77 The theory that WCC's status as first lien-
holder had generated a property interest sufficient to cast it as a
joint venturer was similarly rejected. 78
The first recognition of the potential liability of lenders was
the 1977 decision of a federal district court in Timmreck v. Munn.79
There, the court refused to dismiss an action against a bank which
had allegedly "financed the project by purchasing the plaintiff's
[sic] promissory notes secured by their mortgages." 80 The court
relied in part on the Tenth Circuit's expansive view of the Land
Sales Act in McCown v. Heidler,8s which authorized an action
for aiding and abetting under the Act against individual defend-
ants, "be they officers, directors, or participating planners." 82
Although aware of the previous decisions dismissing complaints
against construction lenders, the Timmreck court, in effect turning
75 Bettis v. Lakeland, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
76 Zachery v. Treasure Lake of Ga., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ga. 1974);
Adema v. Great Northern Dev. Co., 374 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
7 7 Zachery v. Treasure Lake of Ga., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D. Ga.
1974).
The court also accepted WCC's disclaimer as reproduced in its loan agreement:
"'Other than providing financing to facilitate your purchase of the land, Westing-
house Credit Corporation is in no way related to the development of the project or
the sale of the lots, and makes no representations with respect to the land or its
suitability for any purpose"' Id.
7 8 Adema v. Great Northern Dev. Co., 374 F. Supp. 318, 319 (N.D. Ca. 1973).
79433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. M11. 977).
so Id. 399.
Unlike the development scheme in Connor where much of the sales activity
awaited completion of the homes, most sales here were of unimproved land. The
lot buyers in Timmreck furnished down payments and promissory notes to the
developer, who then sold these notes to the lending institution for the ready cash
needed for construction. The role of the lender was thus actually that of construc-
tion financer.
81527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975). While acknowledging that the Land Sales
Act lacked a controlling person clause, the McCown court was nevertheless con-
cemed that the developers and agents might be judgment proof, thus leaving victims
remediless. To effectuate the Act's remedial purposes, the Tenth Circuit construed
it flexibly. Id. 206-07. For an indication that the circuit has retreated from its
position in McCown, see Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978),
discussed at note 113 infra.
82 Id. 207.
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such precedents on their heads, stated that those cases revealed that
"the courts will make inquiries into the extent of the financing
institution's participation in the project." 83 Indeed, by implying
that the level of lender involvement was critical, the Timmreck
opinion moved in the direction of the common law analysis devel-
oped by Connor and its progeny. The court concluded: "The
plaintiffs are therefore entitled to attempt to show that the Bank
exceeded the normal scope of financing practices and actively
participated in and aided the advancement of a fraudulent scheme,
or otherwise assisted 'in the luring of purchasers for an allegedly
dubious project." 84
Continental Bank had asserted in reply to the complaint that
its only significant agreement with the developers was to purchase
the secured promissory notes of qualified lot owners. Yet, according
to the court, this constituted an interest in the success of the
project because increased lot sales translated into profits from loans
secured by the real estate. The court also refused to accept as
complete the bank's characterization of its involvement: further
clarification was needed with respect to the extent of Continental's
participation in the planning of the project and preparation of the
statement of record for H.U.D., and in the developers' sales ac-
tivity. Finally, it remained unresolved whether the bank had held
itself out as the financial backer of the project. The court found
at least a preliminary indication of such backing in Continental's
agreement with the developers to purchase the owners' promis-
sory notes.85 In any case, the court decided sufficient evidence of
lender involvement was present to warrant a trial on that issue, and
it denied the bank's motion for dismissal of the complaint.
Two other courts have recently addressed claims that lending
institutions be held liable as aiders and abettors under the Land
Sales Act. In each instance, the court refused to find liability on
the facts before it. Paralleling judicial reaction to the Connor
decision, these courts appeared reluctant to impose liability yet
83 433 F. Supp. at 406.
84 Id.
85 The court pointed to § 5(b) of the agreement as implying that Continental
would accept no
"obligation to purchase notes of lot owners unless the developer has con-
tinued and is continuing to complete all improvements of the Candlewick
Lake Subdivision, including (without limitation) the dam, lake, association,
club and utilities, within the periods set forth in Exhibit 3 hereto, and it
appears that there are sufficient funds available to complete the improve-
ments."
Id. (footnote omitted). The court speculated that such language might have assured
prospective buyers that the bank had confidence in the project.
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refused to preclude this possibility in a more extreme set of cir-
cumstances. The Third Circuit, in Bartholomew v. Northampton
National Bank of Easton,s8 refrained from determining whether an
aiding and abetting claim against lending institutions is available
to defrauded lot purchasers.8 7 The Bartholomew court read Mc-
Cown 88 as authorizing liability with proof of the lenders' "'know-
ing assistance of or participation in a fraudulent scheme.' "s9 The
plaintiffs had contended that the defendant banks, aware of the
developers' omissions and misrepresentations, had by their inac-
tion aided and added a sense of legitimacy to a fraudulent scheme.
Relying largely on the defendants' uncontradicted affidavits, the
Third Circuit found no convincing proof of the lenders' knowl-
edge and therefore dismissed the complaint. 0° Similarly, in Fuls
v. Shastina Properties, Inc.,91 the court applied McCown and re-
quired a similar showing of knowing assistance of or participa-
tion in a fraudulent scheme. 92  As in Bartholomew, the Shastina
court found no factual dispute warranting a trial on this issue.
In contrast to the "knowing assistance of or participation in"
standard of Bartholomew and Shastina, the Timmreck court focused
almost exclusively on the extent of Continental Bank's participa-
tion in the project, seeming not to require direct evidence of
lender knowledge of fraudulent activity. The court may have been
prepared to infer such awareness from the bank's alleged involve-
ment in the planning of the project and preparation of the official
filings. Such charges of participation at that early and critical
stage, coupled with allegations that the bank held itself out as the
financial backer of the enterprise, thus distinguish Timmreck from
Bartholomew and Shastina93 and may explain the different out-
86584 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1978).
87 The district court had denied the existence of an aiding and abetting claim
under the Land Sales Act. That court disputed the analogy made by plaintiffs and
by the court in McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975), to section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1976). While
the 1934 Act's general antifraud provision applies to "any person" engaging in pro-
hibited activities in connection with the sale of securities, the Land Sales Act applies
by its terms only to developers and their agents. This, the district court noted, was
evidence of a narrower congressional purpose which prohibited application of the
Land Sales Act to a broad range of participants. 584 F.2d at 1294.
88 See text accompanying notes 81 & 82 supra.
89 584 F.2d 1288, 1294 (3d Cir. 1978), quoting McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d
204, 207 (10th Cir. 1975), quoting Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731,
740 (10th Cir. 1975).
90 584 F.2d at 1294.
91448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
92 Id. 990.
93 433 F. Supp. 396, 406 (N.D. Ill. 1977). In Bartholomew, the defendant
lenders participated only to the extent of accepting the assignment of purchasers
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comes. Inde6d, future cases may limit Timmreck, like Connor, to
its own facts: the dearth of cases addressing aiding and abetting
claims under the Land Sales Act makes any conclusions necessarily
tentative. However, if Timmreck's exceedingly broad language is
construed as extending liability for a developer's fraud to any lender
who has a major economic interest in a project and participates
in its promotion, then a substantial potential for liability exists un-
der the Land Sales Act.
2. The Securities Acts
Any probe into the potential indirect liability of construction
lenders under the securities acts 94 is necessarily speculative. Lot
purchasers have rarely utilized the federal securities laws in an at-
tempt to reach construction lenders 5 In Fuls v. Shastina Proper-
ties, Inc.,96 defrauded buyers contended that the lending institu-
tion was a "controlling person" under section 20(a) 97 for purposes
of liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.98 The court rejected the buyers' controlling person theory
even though the lender "periodically received financial statements
and sales reports, and occasionally inspected construction and de-
velopment work," 99 and it found no evidence that the lender "acted
in bad faith or that [it] directly or indirectly induced Shastina Prop-
erties to make the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations" as re-
quired under the Ninth Circuit's test for controlling person liabil-
ity.100 No similar claim has yet been based on the securities laws'
aider and abettor doctrine.
This failure to make such claims does not, however, imply that
they are without merit. Necessarily antecedent to application of the
installment or promissory notes. 584 F.2d at 1291. One of the banks supplemented
this role by holding a mortgage on at least part of the project. Id. In Shastina,
the institution made a loan secured by a deed of trust on the property and by
accounts receivable. 448 F. Supp. at 989. No evidence was offered in either case
showing that the lenders had promoted the project or helped draft the original plans
and documents.
94 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
95 See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1024 (10th Cir. 1978); Fuls v.
Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
96448 F. Supp. 983, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
97 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). See generally Comment, Secondary Liability of
Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts: Toward an Improved Analysis, 126
U. PA. L. REv. 1345 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U. P-. Comment].
9815 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). This claim paralleled the aiding and abetting
claim under the Land Sales Act. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
99 448 F. Supp. at 989.
100 Id. 990.
1979] INDIRECT LIABILITIES OF CONSTRUCTION LENDERS
securities laws to consumer real estate transactions is the question if
a security is involved: more precisely, can a land sales contract
constitute an "investment contract"? The Supreme Court, in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,'0' seemed to lay that
question to rest when it announced that the defrauded buyer must
show a "reasonable expectation of profits." 102 By focusing on profit
expectations, the Court created an investment/consumption dicho-
tomy whereby the ordinary home buyer concerned primarily with a
place to live probably would fall on the consumption side of the
line and thus be unprotected by the securities acts. However, some
recent decisions indicate that Forman has not foreclosed application
of securities law to sales of unimproved lots in an incomplete real
estate development.1 3 Accordingly, indirect liability claims against
101421 U.S. 837 (1975).
102 Id. 852. See, e.g., Note, Securities Regulation-United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman: The Supreme Court Refines the Howey Formula, 54 N.C.
L. REv. 731 (1976). In Forman the Supreme Court addressed claims by residents
of a large housing cooperative. Faced with a rental charge substantially above that
originally advertised, residents brought suit alleging violations of section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (1976), and rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1977). They charged
that the informational bulletin circulated to prospective purchasers of "stock" in the
housing cooperative had misrepresented that the contractor would bear any cost
overruns and had failed to disclose material facts about the developers. The primary
question for the Court was whether the shares of stock, entitling purchasers to an
apartment lease and to voting rights in the cooperative, were "securities" as defined
in the federal securities laws.
The Court's holding that the shares were not "securities" within the Acts
turned on its characterization of an "investment contract," which is one element of
the statutory definition of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1976). Applying Justice
Murphy's test in SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), for distinguishing
investment contracts from other commercial transactions, the Court inquired "whether
the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others." Id. 301. The Court found the element of
profits lacking in Forman. A "reasonable expectation of profits" in the form of
"either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment,
... or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds" was
a necessary premise for an investment contract. 421 U.S. at 852. This sort of
investment decision was to be distinguished from any consumer transaction "motivated
by a desire to use or consume the item purchased." Id. 852-53. The leasing agree-
ments in the housing cooperative were of the latter sort. Although nominally in-
volving the purchase of stock, the plaintiff residents "were attracted solely by the
prospect of acquiring a place to live and not by financial returns on their invest-
ments." Id. 853.
103 The factual setting of the Forman decision is critical. There, the plaintiffs,
residents in a large low-income housing cooperative, were firmly entrenched in their
apartments as they complained of rental increases, 421 U.S. at 844. Later courts
have been asked to find an "investment contract" where the consumption motive of
the plaintiffs is less clear. Purchasers of lots in large recreational or residential
developments have instituted the more recent suits, claiming to have bought their
unimproved lots with the expectation that they would rapidly appreciate in value.
Characteristically, the sales campaigns promise the construction of a variety of
amenities as a "common enterprise": swimming pools, golf courses, sand beaches,
snowmobile trails. When these amenities fail to materialize, the lot buyers face a
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construction lenders may be forthcoming if courts continue to take
a broad view of the securities laws. To the extent that securities
claims against construction lenders can be expected to become more
prevalent, the discussion in part III of the appropriate standard
for lender liability is once again relevant.
The notion that investment contracts, as defined in Forman,
do exist in the context of real estate development finds support
in the recent cases upholding complaints against developers under
the securities acts.104 These cases tie the investment potential of any
publicly owned amenities to the land sale contract by which a single
lot is acquired.10 5 The courts in Timmreck v. Munn 0 6 and
McCown v. Heidler 0 7 focused on the price paid for the land.
Evidence that the purchase price of the unimproved lot would be
inappropriate absent the promised amenities weighed in favor of
finding the land sales contract an investment rather than a con-
sumption decision.108 These cases, however, are perhaps most note-
worthy for their concentration on the seller's efforts. Timmreck,
McCown, and, most recently, Anderson v. Grand Bahama Develop-
ment Co.10 9 all seem quite willing to infer an investment motive
from the promotional emphasis of the developer. The "terms of
the offer," the "plan," and any "economic inducements" are all
relevant to the determination of whether the sale of a "security" was
substantial decrease in the value of their lots. In this setting, an investment/
consumption dichotomy is less helpful. Because the project lies incomplete, lot
owners can argue that they never intended to build or to use the lot for consumption
purposes. The lot purchase was an investment, the intent being to resell at a profit
when community development, notably the completion of the promised amenities,
drove prices upward.
104 McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs permitted to
amend complaint to allege that they relied on the promotional and managerial efforts
of the developer for the appreciation of their investment); Fogel v. Sellamerica,
Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment denied; trial court must consider motivation of the purchaser and
promotional emphasis of the developer); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. Ill. 1977) (defendant's motion for summary judgment denied; court held that
not only the terms of the contract, but also the specific oral and written misrepre-
sentations made in advertising materials should be reviewed); Anderson v. Grand
Bahama Dev. Co., [1979] 6 Hovs. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 834 (Ill. App., Dec. 22,
1978); cf. Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (dicta requiring
that a factual hearing must be held in order to determine whether a cause of action
under the Securities Acts exists against the promoter of recreational lots); Lowery
v. Ford Hill Investment Co., 556 P.2d 1201, 1204-06 (Colo. 1976) (Howey test
used to conclude that Colorado Securities Act encompasses a real estate transaction).
105 See note 103 supra.
106433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. IlM 1977).
107 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
108 Id. 211; 433 F. Supp. at 403.
109 [1979] 6 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 834 (Ili. App., Dec. 22, 1978).
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involved." 0  Thus, any evidence of training sessions emphasizing
real estate as an investment"' or specific language to the same end
in sales brochures 112 might persuade a court that the securities acts
are applicable. Conversely, some other cases indicate that courts
which choose to focus on the express obligations of the developer
in the land sales contract are much less likely to find the existence
of an investment contract."
3
Thus, while decisions like Timmreck and Anderson cannot be
characterized as a trend, they do indicate that the federal securities
laws may not be as unavailable to purchasers in real estate develop-
ments as was believed at the time of the Forman decision. If secu-
rities actions proliferate, it would not be surprising for lending insti-
tutions to find themselves as parties defendant." 4  However, the
standards which courts are likely to apply in any trial on the merits
should make recovery against the lenders unlikely. In order to
11 Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 401 (1977).
111 527 F.2d at 209-10.
112 Id. 210; 433 F. Supp. at 402-03.
113See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978); Joyce v.
Ritchie Tower Properties, 417 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. II!. 1976); Davis v. Rio Rancho
Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); and Happy Investment Group v.
Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The decision in
Woodward is significant in that it signals a retreat within the Tenth Circuit from
its earlier stance in McCown. Purporting to resolve a question of law, the Wood-
ward opinion concludes that, where there is no common enterprise and no reliance
on the developer's managerial efforts indicated in the sales contract, "the expectation
of a profit on resale is insufficient to transform what is essentially a sale of real
property into the sale of an investment contract." 574 F.2d at 1026. McCown
was distinguished as merely permitting plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and to
try to show at trial that defendants were under a "contractual promise" to perform
certain enumerated tasks, thereby enhancing the value of individual lots. Id. How-
ever, such a reading of McCown overlooks the considerable attention that decision
paid to the plaintiffs' motives and the non-contractual representations in the defend-
ant's brochures and oral promotions. Despite this apparent misreading of McCown,
however, it appears that the Tenth Circuit after Woodward will require that plain-
tiffs alleging a "common enterprise" and reliance on the developer's managerial
efforts identify in the sales contract an express promise to construct amenities.
As recently as December, 1978, however, an Illinois appellate court signaled
the continuing vitality of the McCown position when it reaffirmed that not only the
terms of the contract but also the specific promotional representations can be used
to show the existence of an investment contract. See Anderson v. Grand Bahama
Dev. Co., [1979] 6 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 834 (I1. App., Dec. 22, 1978).
The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the statutory definition of a
"security," in Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979), does
not resolve the issue in a real estate context. Applying the Forman standard, the
Court in Daniel excluded pension funds from the scope of the securities laws because
of the absence of a true "exchange" or substantial profit. Such elements are, how-
ever, more readily identifiable in real estate transactions, as the McCown and
Timmreck decisions indicate.
114 See Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
and text accompanying notes 96-100 supra. In Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d
1023 (10th Cir. 1978), several lenders were joined as defendants; the issue of
their liability was not addressed, however.
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impose indirect liability upon a construction lender under the
general antifraud provision, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,"1 a private plaintiff must demonstrate that the lender
was actually aware of the fraud." 6 Evidence of extensive lender
involvement in a real estate development is not sufficient to create
liability; indeed, the development of a scienter requirement in fed-
eral securities law argues persuasively for imposition of a similar
knowledge requirement in private fraud actions under the analogous
Land Sales Act." 7
It is less clear whether a construction lender might still be
considered a "controlling person""n8 and thus be held liable for mis-
leading information in registration statements under the Securities
Act of 1933.119 A simple test for controlling person status and lia-
bility has so far eluded the courts; 120 thus, securities litigation in
a real estate context may indeed implicate construction lenders who
effectively control a builder's transactions in certain circumstances.' 21
Yet, here too, something more than mere lender participation in
the development project seems to be required in order for liability
to attach. The exculpatory language in section 15 of the 1933 Act
shields a "controlling person" from liability where he or she "had
no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe" in the existence
of a misstatement. 22 This language seems to require awareness of
the violation as a precondition to liability, except where ignorance




The extent of indirect construction lender liability thus seems
to remain fairly limited. Common law liability for structural de-
fects seems now to be confined to a rather narrow and perhaps ex-
treme set of circumstances. This is so despite the potentially broad
implications of the California Supreme Court's decision in Connor
115 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1976).
"16 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
"17 See text accompanying notes 146-54 infra.
118 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
119 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1976).
120 See U. PA. Comment, supra note 97, at 1352-53.
121 See Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Inter-
ference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAw.
343 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Douglas-Hamilton].
12215 U.S.C. 977o (1976).
123 See U. PA. Comment, supra note 97, at 1353.
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v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association. 24  As for lender
liability under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act,
the courts differ as to the appropriate standard. The willingness
of the court in Timmrech v. Munn125 to infer knowledge of fraud
from a sufficient degree of lender involvement in a development
project could expose many financial institutions to suits and out-of-
court settlements. The competing standard, requiring actual proof
of lender awareness of fraudulent representations,'12 is understand-
ably less worrisome to construction lenders. Liability under the fed-
eral securities laws is too uncertain to forecast with any confidence,
since courts are only now addressing the antecedent question of the
securities laws' applicability to real estate transactions. However,
previous securities litigation in a context other than real estate
seems to have foreclosed the possibility that mere participation in a
development, even though substantial, would be sufficient to make
a lender liable.
With the limits of construction lenders' indirect liability un-
der current law thus identified, the question arises whether the re-
sults are satisfactory. The practical effect of the participation cri-
terion, by insulating nearly all construction lenders from liability,
has been disastrous to purchasers of defectively constructed homes.
Meanwhile, construction lenders would be more concerned with
the possibility of statutory liability. Although no trends have yet
developed, the recent decisions seem to assume that in certain
circumstances lenders could be sued under the Land Sales Act as
aiders and abettors of fraud.127  Courts have not yet sufficiently
identified what those circumstances might be. Lenders justifiably
might be especially uneasy about the apparent lack of an "actual
knowledge" requirement in Timmreck's Land Sales Act decision.
Indeed, that opinion seems to resemble Connor and could lead
courts in statutory cases, as in the common law cases, to hold
that extensive lender participation suffices for imposition of lia-
bility. Such a formula, however, provides lenders too little pro-
tection in the Land Sales Act cases and furnishes them too much
protection in the construction defects cases.
12469 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
125433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. IMI. 1977).
120 See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
127 Although only Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. I1. 1977), has
gone so far as to uphold such a claim, both Bartholomew v. Northampton Nat'l
Bank of Easton, 584 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1978), and Fuls v. Shastina Properties,
Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978), implied in dicta that a lender who
knowingly abetted a developer's fraud could be held liable, despite the Land Sales
Act's express applicability only to "developers" and "agents."
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To correct these inadequacies, this Comment proposes a new
framework for understanding and assessing indirect liabilities of
construction lenders. This discussion begins with the premise that
the levels of lender participation and extent of economic benefit are
largely irrelevant to a sound theory of indirect lender liability.
Such a theory can be based only on a direct assessment of the
capacity of the construction lender to control the development
enterprise. Since indirect liability is imposed on the lender solely
because of its failure to detect and correct the developer-borrower's
negligent construction or fraudulent misrepresentations, this lia-
bility can be justified only if the lender is in fact in a position
to undertake such supervision.
The participation criterion currently used by the courts de-
pends upon two invalid assumptions: first, that participation in-
creases economic benefit, and, second, that participation and eco-
nomic benefit translate into control over the construction project.
The thesis has been stated as follows:
It is difficult to find a point between protective re-
strictions and total creditor supervision at which control
responsibilities should be imposed. A reasonable and
defensible conclusion would be that, once the creditor is
not satisfied with simply insulating himself from the risk
of loss of capital and interest, and instead insists upon
affirmative participation in the entrepreneurial effort being
financed, he has, in Prosser's terms, entered into a relation-
ship whose expected extraordinary economic benefit jus-
tifies the requirement of special obligations.
Moreover, the fact that the creditor has been able to
obtain affirmative participation is perhaps the truest evi-
dence of his control over the financially-beleaguered
debtor. In this sense, the proper scope of the securities
law should be virtually identical to that recently devel-
oped by the common law. 28
Although these commentators reviewed the Connor decision, they
did not otherwise direct their attention to construction lenders.
However valid in other contexts, these conclusions cannot be ap-
plied soundly to the construction lending industry.
The suggested distinction between defensive and affirmative
participation is difficult to delineate in that industry. According
to some accounts, savings and loan associations often view con-
128 Bartlett & Lapatin, supra note 1, at 655 (citations omitted).
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struction loans only as necessary preliminaries to obtaining profit-
able long-term mortgages from the builder's customers. 129 The
savings and loan associations are said to derive their profit pri-
marily from the interest on these long-term "end loans." If this
sort of single profit calculation is in fact commonly undertaken
by financial institutions, it makes little sense to characterize, as
did the Connor court, agreements linking construction and home
purchase loans as affirmative participation. Indeed, it is also dif-
ficult to perceive how such linkage enhances a lender's control
over the developer's day-to-day operations: while it may extend the
period of the lender's involvement in the project, it does not nec-
essarily entail additional inspection or supervision. The single
profit calculation theory thus suggests that a court misdirects its
energies when, as in Callaizakis v. Astor Development Co.,130 it
focuses on whether the lender was soliciting end loans: this is an
insignificant fact. Such treatment indicates both a misunderstand-
ing of the lenders' decisionmaking process and a confusion of the
concepts of economic benefit and participation.
Connor involved, of course, the additional element of profit
from the land warehousing scheme. It is perhaps appropriate to
speak of unusual participation and economic benefit where, as in
Connor, the lender can expect a return on its investment at two
stages of the transaction. However, the presence of a warehousing
scheme or other lucrative arrangements alone says little about a
lender's ability to prevent the developer's allegedly culpable con-
duct. A lucrative deal may simply reflect a lender's sheer economic
power. Just as a supplier of materials, because of its monopo-
listic position, is sometimes able to exact an extraordinary eco-
nomic benefit from a transaction with the developer, so a lender
possessed of a superior bargaining position might well secure a
substantial return on its investment. Such was Great Western's
fortune in Connor.
This ability to reap a significant financial benefit from a
transaction results from economic control of the marketplace. Yet,
this marketplace influence must be distinguished from control suf-
ficient to justify lender liability. By introducing notions of eco-
nomic benefit and participation into the liability equation, courts
129 Lender Liability for Construction Defects, 5 R. laop. PoB. Ta. 1. 495,
498 (1970); U. Cm. Comment, supra note 25, at 744. The Comment's findings
were based on extensive interviews with Chicago savings and loan associations. They
also indicated widespread use of a penalty system whereby a builder-borrower was
penalized unless all or a certain percentage (usually around 70%) of his purchasers
obtained mortgage funds from the coustruction lender. Id. 744 n.37.
13o 4 IlI. App. 3d 163, 280 NE.2d 512 (1972).
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and commentators have unearthed, not surprisingly, only such mar-
ketplace influence. Chief Justice Traynor concluded in Connor,
for example, that, because of its ability to secure a $30,000 capital
gain from the warehousing scheme as well as the right of first re-
fusal on long-term home purchase mortgages, 131 Great Western
"controlled" the Conejo Valley project. These provisions of Great
Western's construction loan agreement reflect, however, only a dis-
parity of bargaining power. This influence does not translate
into a real capacity to supervise the allegedy culpable conduct of
the home developer. If a construction lender is properly to be
held liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in its oversight
of development operations, whether actual construction or sales ef-
forts, the capacity for exercise of such supervision must be dem-
onstrated. This capacity is not established by proof of economic
benefit or lender participation, the twin indicia of marketplace
influence.132
A review of circumstances in which courts have recognized
creditor control of debtors in nonconstruction contexts supports
this view. One commentator has identified three sources of such
control: voting control, management control, and financial domi-
nation.' -  The first two sources, ownership of voting stock suf-
ficient to select a majority of a corporation's directors, and clauses
in financial agreements giving a creditor the power to make man-
agement appointments, have not appeared in the construction lend-
ing context. Yet, in both instances, there clearly exists the
capacity, through appropriate board or management appointments,
to supervise the allegedly culpable conduct of the borrower. These
judicial determinations of control are consistent, therefore, with
this Comment's assertion that liability must be grounded upon
something other than sheer economic power. Nor is the last
contention defeated by the conclusion of this commentator that,
131 See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
13 2 Two distinctions must be noted between the ability to secure a substantial
profit in the transaction and the capacity for supervision of the activities of the
other party to the transaction. Profit can accrue although the relationship between
the parties lasts but a short time. In contrast, the capacity for supervision re-
quires at the minimum a continuing relationship. If the negligence of the party to
be supervised occurs after the relationship has been terminated, it makes little
sense to argue that supervision is practicable: under such an argument, a party
becomes responsible potentially for the acts of each of its past customers or clients.
Even this continuing relationship, however, is not sufficient unless the supervising
party is in a position, in terms of expertise and capacity for physical inspection, to
oversee the other's conduct. Once again, an individual or business can realize profit
in the transaction despite the absence of any expertise in the business of the other
party. Liability based on negligent supervision cannot justly be imposed, however,
absent the above factors.
133 See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 121, at 344-45.
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in some cases, "financial domination" of a debtor also may con-
fer control on a creditor. The decisions cited to support the equa-
tion of control and financial domination simply do not involve
claims of lender liability. 3 4
B. An Alternative Framework
1. Overview
The foregoing discussion illustrates that lender participation
and economic benefit should not be the critical factors in deter-
mining whether lender liability is justified. The remainder of this
Comment outlines an alternative framework for understanding and
assessing indirect liabilities of construction lenders. The under-
lying premises of the proposed framework already have been devel-
oped. A lender's capacity for control of the developer's negligence
or fraud must be established before liability resting on careless
supervision can be imposed. 135 A court should consider whether
current lender routines indicate that supervision of a particular
aspect of the developer's conduct is feasible. This feasibility must
be viewed in a sense as a threshold requirement, for without evi-
dence that a lender could have acted otherwise, there can be no fault
or blameworthiness, and one would have ventured as a result into
the realm of strict liability. 136
Proof that the proposed oversight can be feasibly undertaken
establishes a necessary but insufficient condition for liability. Once
334 In several instances, the issue was purely jurisdictional-whether a regu-
latory agency had to approve a given transaction turned on whether the transaction
would establish control over a regulated party. See Toolco-Northeast Control Case,
42 C.A.B. 822 (1965); Watt Transport, Inc., 338 I.C.C. 338 (1971); Canadair
Ltd. v. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 320, 250 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1964). In the remaining case, liability was imposed, but not on a
creditor. See In re Walston & Co., 7 S.E.C. 937 (1940) (brokerage firm found
liable by SEC for failure to disclose in its registration statement the control status
of its primary creditor). Given the unusual posture of these cases, their finding
of control with no apparent attention to the issue of feasibility of actual supervision
is neither surprising nor damaging to this Comment's argument.
135 For a brief consideration of the opportunity for control in the context of
lender liability for construction defects, see U. Cm. Comment, supra note 25, at
757-58. See also Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another,
43 YAix L.J. 886 (1934).
136 Such an alternative must be recognized, of course. Yet, it is one which
should be explored only with an adequate understanding of its potential impact on
the housing industry. Even the more limited theory of liability proposed by this
Comment, which affords the lender some measure of self-protection, nonetheless
threatens to raise interest rates on construction loans and drive small-scale developers
out of the housing industry. Strict liability would more severely constrict the
industry. Until further empirical data on market impact is available or until it is
proven that a more limited remedy will not suffice, a theory grounded upon fault
is preferable.
1553
1554 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 127:1524
this threshold is passed, courts should investigate means by which
the construction lender might reduce the risks or spread the costs
of liability for negligent inspection. If no self-protective devices
are identified, lender liability may be too drastic. The lender's
presence in the litigation is likely to be a function of the builder's
insolvency; thus, the construction lender would be potentially lia-
ble for the entire amount of damages resulting from an incident
for which it was only partially responsible. Before such a severe
penalty is imposed, a court should determine whether the lender
can secure itself against the eventuality of the builder's insolvency:
Are there mechanisms by which it can insure the developer's com-
pliance with quality standards? Can the costs of liability be
spread? If the lender is left to bear the costs of liability without
the benefit of self-protective devices, the consequences may render
construction-lender liability inappropriate.
The other side of this argument is that, as between a negligent
lender and a home or lot purchaser, the former is "more blame-
worthy." This is an effective rebuttal in the theoretical case of a
"closed" two-party transaction, but here the market impact de-
mands attention. The examination of self-protective devices is
closely related, therefore, to a final question to be posed by a
court under the proposed framework: What impact will construc-
tion-lender liability have on the housing industry? Even where
the lender has some means of self-protection at its disposal, im-
position of liability may lead to changes in lending policies which
in turn affect the housing industry. Where no devices exist to re-
duce or spread the burden of liability, the result would certainly
be an increase in interest rates and thus a general constriction of
the housing market. The certainty and gravity of such conse-
quences mandate legislative rather than judicial determination of
lender liability policy. However, where both feasibility of over-
sight has been established and constriction of the housing market
at least can be minimized by some lender control over the extent
of its losses, then the balance weighs in favor of relief for the
defrauded buyer.
This three-part test for assessing indirect lender liability-
focusing on feasibility of oversight, availability of self-protective de-
vices, and potential market impact-leads to more sensible results
than those courts have obtained under the participation criterion.
137
Applying this alternate theory to the primary types of liability
claims, this Comment recommends a significant potential for lender
137 See text accompanying notes 41-53 supra.
1979] INDIRECT LIABILITIES OF CONSTRUCTION LENDERS
liability in the construction defects disputes, but would restrict
liability in the fraud cases to a narrow set of circumstances. In
short, the spirit of Connor should be revived and the broad im-
plications of Timmreck rejected.
2. Feasibility of Supervision
Whether it is feasible for a lender to inspect a site for defective
construction can be best answered by considering the customary
procedures and appropriate concerns of a construction lender. The
lending institution's primary responsibility is protection of its un-
derlying security interest. Its loan normally is calculated as a
percentage of the appraised value of the improved land. So long as
the land and building can be repossessed and sold for an amount
equal to the face value of the loan, the lending institution has
averted a losing transaction. To insure that the security interest
has attained a value at least equal to that on the face of the loan,
lender routine currently includes at least a minimal inspection of
the construction site. This inspection verifies that loan funds are
being disbursed on a schedule in accord with the rate and amount
of construction. 138 There is evidence that, in practice, inspectors
often investigate the quality of workmanship.1 39 The response of
courts and lenders has been, of course, to emphasize that such in-
spection is undertaken for the latter's own protection and not for
that of home purchasers 1 40
138 See PRACTICING LAnv INSTUTE, CONSTRUCTION FINANCING 103-14 (1977);
Livingston, Current Business Approaches--Commercial Construction Lending, 13
REAL PoR. ThoB. Th. J. 791 (1978); U. Cm. Comment, supra note 25, at 744-48.
139 See Lubell, supra note 25, at 364; U. CM. Comment, supra note 25, at
747-48. The author of the latter article found on the basis of extensive interviews
with Chicago area loan officers that a vital function served by site inspection was
to insure that adequate and reasonable workmanship was being achieved by builder-
borrowers. The loan associations required inspectors to check as many as 107 con-
struction items, ranging from foundation and framing of steel beams anid floors to
such minor items as storm doors, interior painting, and ornamental iron. Id. 748
n.55.
Lending institutions certainly have the bargaining power and legal capability
to control construction quality. The terms of the loan agreement between lender
and builder often empower the former to insist on quality workmanship as a condi-
tion for continued payment. A model loan agreement recommended for use by
lenders' attorneys contains the following provision:
Where any . . . substantial defective or unworkmanlike labor or materials
are being used in the construction of the Building. . .. the lender shall
have the right to give notice to correct the condition and, if this is not
accomplished within 30 days, Lender may immediately order stoppage of
construction on that portion affected and demand that the condition be
corrected.
PRACTICING LAw INsTrrUTE, CONSTRUCTION FNANCING 363 (1977). This model
agreement also indicates that a lender may stop payment if the builder uses materials
not in accordance with the plans and specifications. Id. 355.
140 See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
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Still, one questions the necessity and appropriateness of that
distinction. Given the strong public interest in preventing faulty
workmanship and protecting consumers who frequently are not on
hand to observe the early stages of construction, courts could justi-
fiably rely upon existing inspection procedures as evidence that
supervision for the benefit of third parties can be practicably un-
dertaken. It would not be the first time that tort law has imposed
a duty of care on third parties where feasible and where public
policy demands.141 Such a duty of care would not extend to all
construction defects but only to those discoverable by a reasonably
efficient and thorough site inspection. Most gross structural defects
would, therefore, be involved; minor defects, however, would not
implicate a lender's exercise of due care.'4 Similarly, if a lender
could reasonably be expected to discover the use of substitute ma-
terials not in accordance with the agreed-upon plans and specifica-
tions, then failure to discover such substitution might expose the
lender to joint liability.143 It remains important, however, to dis-
141 "If the conduct of the actor has brought him into a human relationship
with another, of such character that sound social policy requires either some affirma-
tive action or some precaution on his part to avoid harm, the duty to act or take
the precaution is imposed by law." Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Con-
duct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 886 (1934).
Cf. U. Cm. Comment, supra note 25, at 757, which proposes lender liability
contingent "upon the closeness of the relationship between the parties and upon the
existence of a reasonable opportunity to control the harmful conduct." Id. (empha-
sis in original) (citations omitted). To the extent that a "close relationship" require-
ment threatens to resurrect the participation criterion, it should be rejected so as
properly to fix the courts' attention exclusively on where it properly belongs: the
threshold issue of control. If a lender's "reasonable opportunity to control" is to
be measured on a case-by-case basis, social policy and consumer protection would
be best served by the creation of a rebuttable presumption that the opportunity to
control is reasonable where lenders check on the progress of construction in order
to disburse loan funds. This presumption would correspond to the premise of this
Comment, that construction lenders are not being required to perform tasks not
already regularly undertaken; the law simply imposes sanctions for careless execu-
tion.
142The policy arguments for indirect lender liability to consumers are strongest
when the defects are present in the home's foundation. These are often the most
serious construction defects and frequently can be discovered only during the early
stages of construction. Further, even those purchasers who are able to employ
architects to inspect the builder's product may be unable to detect them, if negotia-
tions begin after construction is in an advanced stage or is completed. See U. Cm.
Comment, supra note 25, at 752.
Because the lender's duty of care would be limited to averting gross defects
and those otherwise detectable by a customary inspection, such a proposal would
not expose lenders to products liability suits for injuries caused by defectively manu-
factured items installed in the home. While there remains a possibility that defec-
tive construction might result in personal injury, see Perez v. United States, No.
78-1107 (1st Cir. Mar. 15, 1979), the defects for which a lender may be held
responsible are more likely the kind which cause property damage and a reduction
in the value of the consumer's investment.
143 See note 139 supra. The model construction loan agreement recommended
in PnAcTcicNG LAw INsTrrrE, CoNsraucnoN Fn ANciwc 355 (1977), contains a
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tinguish such liability, grounded in the lender's negligence, from
the doctrine of vicarious liability in which the lender's conduct is
irrelevant.'4
With respect to a construction lender's statutory liability, the
threshold requirement of feasibility rarely will be satisfied. Claims
against construction lenders under the Land Sales Act and the
securities laws arise in connection with fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions or omissions of material facts as to the builder's financial
condition or the nature of the proposed community. Absent actual
notice of fraud, it is impractical to demand lender supervision of
the developer's sales operations or rigorous scrutiny of his official
filings.145
The issue of feasibility is most appropriately addressed in terms
of the varying standards of Timmreck v. Munn 14 6 and Bartholo-
mew v. Northampton National Bank of Easton.147 Recall first that
indirect liability is grounded in a theory of supervision. In the
common law context, the construction lender could be liable if it
failed to recognize and correct the developer's gross construction
errors.148 In the statutory context, the lender is being called upon
to recognize and arrest any fraud by the developer. Timmreck and
Bartholomew differ as to the point at which that duty to supervise
selling operations and scrutinize official filings is activated. In
Bartholomew that point is reached when the construction lender
acquires actual knowledge of the developer's fraud.149 The broad
language of Timmreck, on the other hand, implies that the duty
to supervise is activated at an earlier point: whenever the lender
has a substantial economic interest and involvement in a project
and, therefore, can be presumed to have constructive knowledge of
the developer's fraud. Participation and not actual knowledge seem
to be key, at least for purposes of upholding the plaintiffs' com-
plaint.150
provision empowering the lender to insist upon the use of agreed-upon materials:
"If building shall not be constructed, completed, and equipped strictly in accord-
ance with the Plans and Specifications, . . . then Lender at its option may terminate
the Agreement."
14 4 See W. PaossEH, HAwDBOoK OF TH LAW OF TORTS 458-59 (4th ed. 1971);
U. C . Comment, supra note 25, at 757. Vicarious liability arises frequently when
losses have been caused by employees' torts which, as a practical matter, are certain
to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise.
145 See text accompanying notes 151-54 infra.
146 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
147 584 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1978).
148 See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra.
149 See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
1:0 See text accompanying notes 79-90 supra.
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The result in Timmreck may be correct since the lender there
had allegedly engaged in the planning of the project and drafting
of the required filings. Such circumstances directly implicated the
lender as a protagonist in the fraud, not merely as a negligent su-
pervisor. Yet, if Timmreck is not read carefully and limited to its
facts, it could be construed as imposing constructive knowledge of
fraud and, therefore, an affirmative duty to arrest fraud on any
lender who participates extensively in a development project. It
becomes imperative, then, according to the framework proposed in
this Comment, that courts identify the circumstances in which lender
supervision of selling operations and investigation of official docu-
ments is feasible.
A duty to inquire and supervise is feasible only at the point
at which a lender actually receives evidence of a violation. One
need only consider the practical implications of the alternative con-
structive knowledge standard; if, as in Fuls v. Shastina Properties,
Inc.,"1 a salesman fraudulently represents that lots are in short
supply and that investment in them will appreciate rapidly, such
information might be imputed to a lender actively involved in the
project but possessing no actual knowledge of the violation. Active
lenders could avoid liability under such a standard only by con-
tinually monitoring the developer's day-to-day selling operations.
However, a lender cannot be expected to employ one or more in-
dividuals to insure that a developer maintain an acceptable level
of accuracy in his official and informal dealings.
In contrast, the more limited actual knowledge requirement of
Bartholomew yields an acceptable result. Any duties imposed on
lenders under the proposed framework must satisfy a minimum
feasibility requirement. It appears reasonable to require that a
lender, once possessing actual knowledge of fraud, discontinue all
dealings with the developer and notify appropriate parties of its
findings. Such a standard does not obligate a lender to monitor
daily sales operations or scrutinize every sales brochure and docu-
ment for misrepresentations or omissions. Where a lender, in the
ordinary course of dealing, gains access to any evidence of fraud,
it at that point becomes responsible for investigating the matter
before conducting any further business with the borrower.
It is important to avoid overstating this responsibility. Perhaps
its limited nature can be made clearer by reconsidering the most
likely scenario. Before committing to a loan, any prudent lender
will demand some information as to the builder's financial condi-
151 448 F. Supp. 983, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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don, the general outline of the proposed community, and its ac-
ceptability to local authorities. 15 2 Such pieces of information are
critical to the loan decision .1 8  Similarly, financial institutions,
such as those in Timmreck, Bartholomew, and Shastina Properties,
which purchase land sales contracts from the developer at a
discounted price, will exercise these precautions. When this prelim-
inary information, currently employed by lenders in their decision-
making process, indicates that a developer's promises grossly over-
reach his financial capacity, the lender is alerted to the possibility
of fraud. In effect, it has gained, through its ordinary course of
dealing, actual knowledge of fraud. If the lender proceeds with the
loan despite the information indicating a disparity between promise
and reality, it properly may be held liable as an aider and abettor
of fraud under the standard enunciated in Bartholomew.154
The foregoing outlines the scenario in which actual knowledge
of fraud is most likely to arise. It represents the limited sense in
which a lender's inspection for a developer's fraudulent misrepre-
sentations may be feasibly undertaken. However, an expansion
of this scenario of actual knowledge obtained in the course of nor-
mal loan-commitment or financing decisions to a requirement of
broader, ongoing supervision of sales operations, violates the feasi-
bility threshold imposed by this Comment's framework and, thus,
precludes indirect lender liability. Such a result is not inconsistent
with the earlier conclusion that lender liability under the common
law for construction defects should be expanded.5 5  The premise
of that discussion was that lenders currently make periodic site in-
spections and thus are not being required to undertake entirely for-
1 2 See PRAcTrncrG LAW LNsTrrUTE, CoNsaucnoN FnhAwcnrG 51-55 (1977);
Livingston, supra note 138.
153 For example, such information bears upon the probability that the project
will yield profitable end loans and that amounts due under the land sales contracts
will be easily collected. Information concerning the developer's promotional pack-
age is critical to any appraisal by the lender of the value of the land securing the
sales contract. The purchase price of a single lot can be significantly affected by
the attractiveness of any promised amenities. A lot otherwise worth $5,000 may
sell for $10,000 with the understanding that it soon will border upon lakes, club-
houses, and ski slopes. Should such amenities fail to materialize, the lot will, when
resold after foreclosure, yield only the lesser original value of $5,000. To secure
itself against such an eventuality, a prudent lender can be expected, therefore, to
inquire with sufficient thoroughness into a developer's reliability as well as the
probability of project completion. See U. CM. Comment, supra note 25, at 745.
154 Recall that the court in Connor criticized the defendant lending institution
for ignoring ominous signs of thin capitalization in the developer-borrower's financial
statement. See note 32 supra.
155 See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra.
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eign responsibilities; in contrast, expansion of lender liability for
aiding and abetting a developer's statutory fraud would entail sig-
nificant expansion of a lender's activities far beyond present custom.
3. Lender's Self-Protection
The scope of a lender's duty should not depend on present
custom alone. Any theory of indirect lender liability should undergo
a cost analysis as well. One must inquire if the lender is in a posi-
tion, once it becomes aware of a developer's fraud or negligence, to
enforce compliance by the borrower and thereby restrict the num-
ber of liability claims at minimal cost to itself. Alternatively, one
must consider if there are market mechanisms by which the con-
struction lender can spread the costs of liability.
Self-protective devices do exist by which a lender can shoulder
its already restricted liability for a developer's fraud. If the insti-
tution actually gains knowledge of a violation sufficiently early, it
can reject the builder's loan application. If discovery comes after
a portion of the construction loan funds have been disbursed, the
lender may be able to suspend further "progress payments" until
the developer has provided evidence of compliance or has otherwise
satisfied his customers. 156  On the other hand, a finance company
which merely purchases discounted land sales contracts arguably
has less leverage over the builder. Once the contracts are pur-
chased, the relationship between builder and finance company is at
an end. The finance company can threaten to discontinue future
dealings, but this is certainly not likely to induce a "fly-by-night"
developer to fulfill his commitments.
Control over progress payments also enables construction lend-
ers to minimize their burdens of liability for faulty construction.
By making such installments contingent on satisfactory workman-
ship at each stage of construction, commercial lenders can certainly
encourage builder compliance with quality standards and insure that
errors are corrected. At minimal cost to themselves, the lenders
may thereby reduce the threat of future liability.
157
1 5 6 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CoNsTRUTcIoN FNANCING 78-79 (1977).
157 See U. Cm. Comment, supra note 25, at 748, for the view, based on a
Chicago survey, that some loan associations uniformly withhold ten percent of the
loan fund until the purchaser has moved into the completed house and has found it
satisfactory. Such "reserve accounts" are also a common device to secure lenders
against mechanics" liens, see generally Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds
in the Building Trades, 68 YALE LJ. 138 (1958); however, no further evidence has
been found to suggest that their use for purposes of ensuring purchaser satisfaction
is widespread.
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Of equal significance is the ability of a loan association to in-
crease interest rates and thereby procure enough insurance to cover
damages incurred in suits by purchasers of defectively constructed
homes. Its transaction volume should enable the lender to spread
the cost of insurance widely enough so as to minimize the burden
on itself and any individual borrower. 58 The cost of compensat-
ing victims of construction defects would thus be spread among all
purchasers. As the law currently stands, such victims often find
themselves without remedy if the developer becomes insolvent after
completion of the home but before a money judgment can be se-
cured. The construction lender emerges as the only viable de-
fendant.
In the analogous context of consumer goods transactions, courts
have acknowledged the superior cost-spreading ability of finance
companies: they have responded by permitting defrauded custom-
ers to interpose contractual defenses to claims filed by large-scale
creditors who had purchased the consumers' installment contracts.159
This doctrine, which applies even to defenses relating to the quality
of the goods, has focused on the finance company's ability to pro-
tect its own interests. 60 In Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,'., for
example, the finance company retained in a "reserve account" part
of the purchase price of a note. That amount was payable to the
seller only upon the buyer's completion of his payments. This
"holding back" of part of the purchase price was viewed by the
court as sufficient protection to warrant affirmance of the buyer's
quality defense. It could be argued, of course, that there is a sub-
stantial difference between susceptibility to defenses and the af-
firmative liability being proposed in this Comment.162 Yet, even
here, the gap seems to be narrowing. One commentator has noted
158 See S. CAl.. Comment, supra note 11, at 370-71; U. Ca. Comment supra
note 25, at 754.
159 The seminal case in this area is Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County
Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); see also Kaw Valley State
Bank and Trust Co. v. Riddle, 549 P.2d 927 (Kan. 1976). For support of this
development, see, e.g., Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other Anachro-
nisms in Consumer Credit, 52 Tux. L. REv. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Country-
man]; Rosenthal, Negotiability-Whe Needs It?, 71 CoLum. L. REV. 375 (1971);
Comment, Implied Consumer Remedy Under FTC Trade Regulation Rule-Coup
de Grace Dealt Holder in Due Course?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 876 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Coup de Grace?].
160 See Countryman, supra note 159, at 10; Coup de Grace?, supra note 159, at
890-91.
16163 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
162 See U. Cm Comment, supra note 25, at 750.
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that a recent Federal Trade Commission regulation 163 does not re-
strict a consumer's recovery to amounts paid to the finance com-
pany after the latter's purchase of the installment contract; rather,
he contends that, "in a proper case, a buyer can obtain all payments
made to the retail seller as well as to the finance agency in an
action brought against the finance agency alone." I This trend
toward affirmative liability of finance companies supports the valid-
ity of the analogy drawn as to measures of self-protection available
to construction lenders and finance companies.
4. Market Impact
A detailed forecast of the economic impact of construction-
lender liability on the housing industry is beyond the scope of this
Comment, though such an empirical study would be valuable to
courts, legislatures, and commentators. This Comment has as-
serted, however, that extent of market impact may be a function
of the lender's capacity for self-protection. Where no such capacity
appears, the inevitable rise in interest rates would most likely
constrict the housing market to an unacceptable degree. The cir-
cumstances of lender liability recommended in this Comment
should not have such severe consequences since, as discussed
above,165 construction lenders are in a position to reduce the risks
and spread the costs of liability. Indeed, by passing the cost of
insurance on to builders and ultimately consumers, a lender spreads
it not only numerically but temporally as well; since mortgages
are paid off over time, even significant price increases should not
appreciably inflate monthly payments.166
Lender liability for defective construction may, of course, have
some adverse consequences. Interest rates will rise somewhat and de-
veloper-borrowers will be screened more conservatively; the effect
may be to drive smaller, less financially stable developers from the in-
163 FTC Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a)
(1977). This regulation requires every contract which combines the sale of con-
sumer goods with the sale of credit to contain the following clause:
NOTICE
Any holder of this Consumer Contract Is subject to all Claims and
Defenses which the Debtor Could Assert Against the Seller of Goods or
Services Obtained Pursuant Hereto or with the Proceeds Hereof.
Id.
164 RErrz, CONSUiM1R CREDrr PRoTEToior UNDEa TnE MArNuSoN-Moss WA-
RNY AcT 124 (1978).
165 See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra.
166 See U. Cm. Comment, supra note 25, at 756.
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dustry. 67 While this may at first seem beneficial, it may, in time,
diminish price competition within the industry and also skew con-
struction towards larger apartment and townhouse complexes and
away from single units and smaller apartments. 6" Despite these
ramifications, however, the balance in these cases should still fall
in favor of relief for the home purchaser. Buying a home is gen-
erally the largest investment a family makes. A latent structural
defect leading to such serious damage as a cracked foundation could
prove financially ruinous to many families unless the loss can be
shifted and spread.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has reviewed the current potential for indirect
construction-lender liability and has noted the assumptions under-
lying imposition of such liability. Finding this conceptual blue-
print practically and theoretically inadequate, it has advanced an
alternative framework for understanding and assessing the validity
of liability claims. At a minimum, feasibility of lender super-
vision of the developer's allegedly culpable conduct must be estab-
lished before liability for negligent supervision may be imposed.
When this threshold requirement is applied to statutory claims,
lender investigation into a developer's sales operations and official
filings rarely appears practical. Construction lenders should not,
therefore, be held responsible for arresting a developer's fraudulent
misrepresentations or omissions until such time as they receive
evidence of a violation. Where the crucial threshold of feasibility
is passed, as with lender inspection of construction sites, attention
must then be directed to the matter of costs. The availability of
sufficient means of lender self-protection can so minimize industry-
wide and individual costs that lender liability is a justifiable solution
to the problem of defective construction.
167 See Lubell, supra note 25, at 366; U. Cm. Comment, supra note 25, at 754.
168 See Lubell, supra note 25, at 165; S. CAL. Comment, supra note 11, at 371.
